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 1 
Development, dams and Dilma: the saga of Belo Monte 
 
Introduction 
The proposed Belo Monte hydropower dam complex on the River Xingu in 
Brazil’s Amazon region is the second largest in the country, and the world’s third 
largest in terms of installed capacity (11,200 megawatts) after Itaipu and the 
Three Gorges Dam in China. As the focus of intense conflict for more than three 
decades, even while still on the drawing board, Belo Monte is emblematic of the 
continuing struggle between the competing demands of Brazil’s rapidly 
modernising economy and the conservation of its forests and natural resources.  
This confrontation has been overseen by successive government 
administrations since the project was originally conceived in the 1970s, a mantle 
now inherited by Dilma Rousseff, and one that will no doubt be passed on to her 
successor(s) through this and other hydro-schemes planned for the Amazon. As 
Minister of Mines and Energy under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Rousseff 
was famously bullish in her support for infrastructure building to accelerate the 
development process with (if her critics are to be believed) little apparent regard 
for the environmental and social impacts on Amazonia’s rainforest and local 
populations.  
During her initial months as President, however, she will have discovered 
that in executing such mega-projects the exigencies of all stakeholders, not just 
those of powerful politicians and national economic policy-makers, must be 
accommodated if turmoil is to be avoided, or at least ameliorated. Belo Monte thus 
serves as an instructive example of the potential dangers and pitfalls of top-down 
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planning and failure to incorporate provisions for adequate consultation, 
participation, compensation and comprehensive resettlement. Yet Belo Monte is by 
no means the first such case in Brazil, and it remains to be seen to what extent its 
lessons will be internalised and acted upon in the future. 
For the present, however, rather like a medieval jousting tournament, the 
battle lines at Belo Monte have been firmly drawn. On one side is the powerful pro-
dam lobby, comprising construction companies driven by commercial interests 
and an ideological commitment to such projects as symbols of modernization and 
development. This approach is supported by the Ministry of Mines and Energy 
(MME), the federal and regional electricity authorities (Eletrobrás and Eletronorte 
respectively), as well as numerous consulting firms, construction companies and 
academic interests, together with the international aluminum industry, all in the 
name of development.  
On the other side, lances poised, is an increasingly vociferous set of local, 
national and global organizations defending the Amazon and its people from what 
is perceived as an all-out attack on the region by self-serving politicians and 
industrialists. Opponents include indigenous groups, the country’s Movement of 
Dam-Affected People (MAB), conservation and environmental organizations and 
international anti-dam lobbies, including the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), 
Friends of the Earth–Brazilian Amazonia, Greenpeace and the International Rivers 
Network (IRN), as well as environmentalist academics.1 Some opponents are 
motivated by a visceral hatred of all such large infrastructure schemes as being, 
almost by definition, inimical to sustainable development. Other less extreme 
critics demand the introduction of appropriate safeguards to protect the 
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environment and guarantee the livelihoods and rights of affected populations as an 
integral part of the development process and not just as an afterthought. 
 
Background 
Belo Monte, originally known as Kararaô, was first planned in the 1970s, but was 
soon shelved due to controversy, only to be resuscitated in the 1980s by President 
Sarney. In 1989 a massive and now famous meeting was staged at the nearby town 
of Altamira, opposing proposals for the six-dam complex, which was part of 
ambitious plans published by the national power authority Eletrobrás to construct 
almost 300 dams by 2010.2 The ‘First Encounter of the Indigenous Nations of the 
Xingu’ attracted environmentalists from all over the world, including Sting, the 
British pop star. This meeting drew international attention to the potentially 
negative impacts of the scheme and to the sheer strength of local opposition. The 
most dramatic single image to emerge from this tumultuous gathering was that of 
Tuíra, a female indigenous leader, angrily waving a machete in the face of engineer 
José Antônio Muniz Lópes (later President of Eletronorte), which had worldwide 
repercussions and probably influenced further postponement of the project. 
 A second feasibility study presented three options for a smaller complex 
based on a run-of-the-river model rather than the huge reservoirs envisaged in 
earlier plans. Under the latest design, two canals would divert water away from 
indigenous reserves into two reservoirs to prevent flooding. Electricity would be 
generated using three dams: Belo Monte (90 metres high/3,545 metres long), 
Pimentel (36/6,248) and Bela Vista (33/351), with two power stations at Belo 
Monte (generating 11,000 MW) and Pimentel (233 MW).  
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The total inundated area under these new proposals would be reduced 
from 1,225 to 440 square kilometres. Costing some R$20 billion (US$12 billion) 
Belo Monte is justified within the national ‘Plan for Accelerated Development’ 
(PAC) as essential for filling an estimated energy gap of 5–8 per cent a year, for 
both industrial and domestic purposes; notably to satisfy heavy, subsidized 
consumers such as the regional aluminum and iron and steel industries.3 Another 
justification given is to help avoid major blackouts, of which there were 91 in 2010, 
almost double the number experienced over the country during the previous year 
(The Economist, 12 Feb 2011). 
Belo Monte is considered a flagship project of national modernization and 
development, which Lula promised would go ahead ‘by fair means or foul’ (na lei 
ou na marra). Yet President Lula’s dogmatism has been matched by equally strong 
opposition from many quarters. A ‘Second Encounter of the Peoples of the Xingu’ 
in May 2008 and further protests in 2010 underlined continuing antagonism to 
Belo Monte and the development paradigm that it symbolises for many people. 
Following in the footsteps of Sting, film director James Cameron visited the site to 
express his concerns, and later released an anti-Belo Monte film.4 Other celebrities, 
such as former US president Bill Clinton and Arnold Schwarzenegger, have also 
publicly opposed the project; all to little avail so far. 
In February 2010, Brazil’s environmental control agency (IBAMA) granted a 
provisional licence approving the project impact assessment and giving 
permission for the project auction to take place in April of that year, which was 
won by the Norte Energia consortium. After this, local indigenous and community 
leaders warned of imminent violence, and Kayapó chief Raoni Metuktire openly 
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declared war on the project. The auction was subsequently cancelled by the office 
of the Federal Attorney General and the provisional licence cancelled on the 
grounds that the process was illegal and infringed article 176 of the Constitution 
by not taking due account of the impacts on indigenous lands. But this decision 
was itself annulled on appeal and the auction results were reinstated the same day.  
In August 2010, President Lula signed the contract with the Norte Energia 
consortium, but project construction itself could not begin until IBAMA granted the 
installation licence. For this to happen, the consortium had to prove that it had met 
40 environmental mitigation preconditions for the first environmental licence to 
be issued. Although many of these requirements had not been met, in January 
2011 IBAMA granted a partial installation licence, and work began on setting up 
the construction site and clearing access roads. A month later, however, the 
Federal Public Prosecutor filed a lawsuit against Belo Monte and a judge blocked 
the project on the grounds that all preconditions had not been satisfied. Continuing 
the ding-dong battle, on 3 March 2011 a regional federal judge overturned this 
decision, allowing preparatory work to start immediately.  
 A month later, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) of 
the Organisation of American States (OAS) officially requested that the licensing 
process for Belo Monte be suspended on the grounds that the free, prior and 
informed consent (FPIC) of traditional peoples to be affected had not been sought, 
and that this constituted a breach of their human rights.  The Brazilian government 
tartly rejected this suggestion, responding firmly that, ‘The hydroelectric scheme 
of Belo Monte should be seen as an important factor in regional and national socio-
economic development, with positive impacts on national power-generating 
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capacity and, consequently, on Brazilians’ quality of life’ (República Federativa do 
Brasil, 2011) . To express her displeasure President Rousseff even went as far as 
withdrawing the country’s ambassador to the OAS and threatened to suspend 
payment of its dues to the IACHR.  
The human rights commission eventually withdrew its condemnation of 
Brazil’s actions, and an environmental licence for the construction of Belo Monte 
was issued. Further legal challenges followed, however, and in late September 
2011 a federal judge again ordered works to be halted, this time on the grounds 
that fish stocks on the River Xingu could be damaged. Yet given the determination 
of the Brazilian government to go to almost any lengths to push ahead with the 
project, it seems unlikely at the time of writing that the dam will be permanently 
stopped by a judicial challenge. 
 
Potential impacts of Belo Monte 
Hydropower, which currently meets 80 per cent of Brazil’s energy needs, is often 
portrayed as environmentally benign and a fundamental prerequisite for the 
country’s development. However, there are trade-offs whose costs are not usually 
incorporated into wider economic calculations by the vested interests behind such 
schemes as Belo Monte. Opposition to this and other dam projects has been voiced 
on economic, environmental and social grounds.  
It is claimed, for example, that the economic efficiency of Belo Monte will be 
compromised by the fact that, due to seasonal fluctuations in river flow, the project 
will be forced to operate below capacity for much of the year. In order to be 
financially viable, it is suggested that further dams would have to be built 
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upstream to stabilize water supply for electricity generation. This would entail 
reviving earlier plans to build Altamira (formerly Babaquara), thus flooding a 
much larger area than Belo Monte, with dramatic social and ecological 
consequences. Furthermore, increased drought risk in the Amazon due to 
predicted climate change (as witnessed in 2005 and 2010) could compromise Belo 
Monte’s power-generating capacity, making the scheme uneconomic. Funded 
largely by the Brazilian taxpayer through the National Bank for Economic and 
Social Development (BNDES), the cost burden of required subsidies would fall on 
the public (Global Post, accessed 13 May 2011). 
Suspicions about the economic robustness of the project were aroused by 
the fact that major construction companies such as Odebrecht and Camargo Corrêa 
decided to pull out of the project auction. A last-minute consortium headed by 
Queiroz Galvão and the meat-packing Bertin group won with an unusually low bid, 
supposedly attracted by low rates of interest charged by the BNDES, which is 
covering 80 per cent of the dam’s cost, as well as further guarantees from the 
government to cover unexpected additional costs should they arise (Branford 
2010). 
 Considerations of economic efficiency aside, most inhabitants of the region 
around Belo Monte have good reason to be worried about the future. It is estimated 
that the project could displace upwards of 20,000 people from their lands and 
homes, reminiscent of the upheaval caused by construction of the nearby Tucuruí 
dam on the River Tocantins. Inaugurated in 1984, Tucuruí was the largest dam 
ever built until then in a tropical rainforest area and was designed primarily to 
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supply subsidised electricity to the aluminum complexes of Albrás-Alunorte and 
Alumar as part of the Greater Carajás Programme (Hall 1989: 4). 
Some 35,000 people (60 percent rural), including six small towns, were 
displaced as 2,500 square miles of uncleared forest were inundated. Urban 
resettlement was not without its problems but went ahead reasonably well. 
However, rural resettlement provision was chaotic and badly planned. Those 
affected saw their livelihoods disrupted by inadequate and delayed compensation, 
the failure to provide alternative farmland, and many other problems. Social and 
environmental mitigation enjoyed low official priority within Eletronorte, but a 
series of local protests in the early 1980s by villagers and civil society groups 
managed to extract some further concessions in the form of new settlements, 
relocation and infrastructure provision.  
Another valuable case is provided by two dam projects on the São Francisco 
River in Northeast Brazil (Hall 1994).  At the Itaparaica hydropower scheme 
during the 1980s, and for the first time in Brazil, a vigorous social movement 
managed to win a comprehensive resettlement programme for 40,000 displaced 
people. This contrasted sharply with the earlier experience of the Sobradinho dam 
project a few hundred kilometres upstream, executed in the 1970s during a period 
of military dictatorship and authoritarian planning. Here, where there was no 
grassroots protest, 70,000 people were ‘involuntarily displaced’ from their homes, 
but compensation was far more selective and unsatisfactory compared with 
Itaparica, with many losing out altogether. These experiences have generated 
useful lessons about the potential power of popular demands to leverage 
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concessions from the authorities, especially in Brazil’s current more politically 
open and democratic circumstances. 
Another social dimension of Belo Monte concerns its impact upon 
indigenous groups, who are especially angry that a stretch of the River Xingu will 
shrink and adversely affect fishing and other natural resources upon which they 
depend. Large-scale population displacement will create many difficulties around 
providing fair and adequate compensation, rebuilding people’s livelihoods, loss of 
assets and resettlement provision, not to mention violent confrontations along the 
way. The lives of local indigenous leaders have already been threatened, while one 
local farmers’ leader and prominent anti-dam campaigner known as ‘Dema’ was 
murdered in 2001, a crime that went unpunished, like so many in these 
circumstances (Amazonia.org.br accessed 8 May 2011; Fearnside 2006) . Altamira, 
it should be remembered, was also the region in which hired gunmen murdered 
the emblematic Sister Dorothy Stang in 2005 as she defended local peasant 
farmers against land-grabbers (Greenpeace, 2005). 
While Belo Monte will create employment for over 18,000 laborers directly, 
and perhaps 25,000 jobs indirectly, there is also a wider multiplier effect. If the 
Tucuruí and Carajás experience is anything to go by, Belo Monte will act as a giant 
population magnet, attracting up to 100,000 migrants in search of work. This will 
fuel land speculation, placing pressure on fragile forest resources and creating 
major problems for the already overstretched economic and social urban 
infrastructure in towns such as Altamira. For example, IBAMA has estimated that 
Belo Monte could lead to the deforestation of more than 5,000 square kilometres of 
rainforest over a 20-year period (Amazônia, 25 April 2011). Flooding of the 
 10 
rainforest will also reduce biodiversity stocks and alter fish migration routes. 
Decomposition of flooded vegetation may produce large quantities of methane, a 
powerful greenhouse gas, as foliage gradually decays under the rising waters, as 
has happened elsewhere in the region. These ecological impacts have been 
routinely documented in comparable Amazon dam projects such as Tucuruí.5 They 
are likely to be exacerbated by unregulated heightening of the dam water level 
‘through the back door’ as the result of obfuscation and underhand tactics 
deployed by the pro-dam lobby.6 
 
Wider implications of Belo Monte 
The hotly contested debate about Belo Monte needs to be placed in a broader 
context, for the project is indicative not only of the model of development that was 
pursued under the Lula government but also of the way in which key decisions 
about development were taken and are still taken under the Rousseff 
administration. The PT came to power when state capitalism was widely 
discredited throughout the world, partly because of the collapse of the USSR in the 
late 1980s. Yet many strategic thinkers in the PT (including President Rousseff) 
had been revolutionaries in their youth and still defined themselves as ‘socialist’. 
While accepting that it was no longer feasible to think of the state owning the 
‘means of production’, they believed that Brazil should learn from the success of 
other countries, particularly in Southeast Asia, where the state had played a key 
role in steering development. They were particularly impressed by South Korea’s 
ability to promote research and to patent new products and ideas, about which 
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they spoke admiringly in policy documents drawn up before Lula’s inauguration in 
2003. 
As a result, the two Lula administrations (January 2003–December 2010) 
deliberately set out to increase the role of the state in the economy, believing that 
the neo-liberal reforms adopted by Lula’s predecessor, President Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso, had given too free a rein to large economic groups, both 
national and international. However, rather than building up the state as a strong, 
autonomous power with its own separate interests, as would have happened 
under state capitalism, the Lula government decided, instead, to use the state 
machine to pour huge sums of money into a tiny, carefully selected group of 
companies so that they could become powerful corporations, broadly similar to 
the Japanese keiretsu and the South Korean chaebols. The objective was to create 
corporations that could compete as equals with the biggest companies in the 
world.  
Again, somewhat surprisingly, the Lula administrations did not seek to 
influence decision-making in these corporations but merely to give them the 
economic clout to pursue their own interests. As some analysts have put it, ‘Rather 
than the state assuming once again a key role in the economy, what we have seen 
is an alignment of the state to the dynamic and demands of large entrepreneurial 
groups with solid positions in the market before the Lula government.’7 In his 
article in this collection, Alfredo Saad-Filho has dubbed the term ‘neo-
developmentalism’ for this new form of state intervention (Alfredo Saad-Filho 
2011). He also points out that neo-developmentalism has not replaced 
neoliberalism but coexists alongside it.  
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 One of the main ways in which the state has increased its presence is by 
beefing up the role of the BNDES, which was greatly strengthened, with loans 
increasing from R$35.10 billion (US$21.91 billion) in 2003 to R$168.40 billion 
(US$105.10 billion) in 2010. As a result, annual disbursements from the BNDES are 
today worth more than twice the combined expenditures of the World Bank and 
the Inter-American Development Bank.8 Since 2005, three-quarters of the loans 
have been channelled to big companies in sectors regarded as key by the 
government, such as mining, ethanol, paper and pulp, oil and gas, hydroelectric 
power and farming.9  
It is largely thanks to this BNDES funding that giant Brazilian economic 
groups have been formed; examples include JBS–Friboi, which after a series of 
take-overs of other companies in the sector has become the world’s largest beef 
processor, and Brasil Foods, formed from the merger of Sadia and Perdigão, which 
is today one of the world’s largest food groups. Indeed, although the function of the 
BNDES is to promote the country’s social development along with its economic 
development, only a tiny proportion of its resources are channelled into education 
(0.13 percent of disbursements in 2009), health and social services (0.3 percent), 
water, sanitation and rubbish collection (together 0.66 percent) (BNDES.gov.br).  
 The Belo Monte project is a good example of the role that the Lula 
government developed for the state sector. Even though BNDES is providing 80 
per cent of the investment, the state does not control the project, deliberately 
deciding not to have a majority control in Norte Energia, the consortium that is 
building Belo Monte. The three state-owned companies in Norte Energia – Centrais 
Elétricas do Norte do Brasil S/A (Eletronorte), Companhia Hidro Elétrica do São 
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Francisco (Chesf), and Centrais Elétricas Brasileiras S/A – together hold just under 
half (49.98 percent) of the voting shares, so they could be outvoted by the other 
shareholders, which are almost all big construction companies (Dams in 
Amazonia). 
 Since the state has aligned itself so closely with big capital, concerns have 
been raised about the kind of development the government is promoting in the 
name of the Brazilian people. In 2000 the BNDES played a key role in setting up the 
‘Initiative for the Integration of South American Regional Infrastructure’ (IIRSA), a 
vast programme that seeks to integrate the different infrastructure projects in the 
South American region. Involving an investment of US$55bn, it consists of ten 
integration hubs (ejes in Spanish; eixos in Portuguese), each with several corridors 
composed of highways, hidrovias, railways, and pipelines. Its main objective is not 
to promote interdependence among the South American countries but to make it 
easier and cheaper for the region to send abroad its agricultural and mining 
exports (Killeen 2007). 
Eight of the 31 projects given priority are being carried out, and they all 
involve BNDES investment. Moreover, the Brazilian authorities are clearly taking 
advantage of IIRSA to make it easier for Brazilian companies to exploit natural 
resources in other countries and to promote the country’s energy security. In June 
2010, for instance, the Lula government signed an agreement with the Peruvian 
government to build six hydroelectric stations in the region of Inambari in the 
Peruvian Amazon, where Brazilian companies are active. As much as three-
quarters of the energy will probably be transferred to Brazil through transmission 
lines that will connect the projects in Peru with the hydroelectric stations of Jirau 
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and Santo Antônio along the Madeira river (Andean Currents, 2 April 2010). The 
BNDES, which is providing most of the finance, is doing little to respond to 
concerns among local people about the project’s potentially harmful social and 
environmental consequences. 
 Belo Monte fits well into the kind of development model being promoted by 
IIRSA.  As we have seen, there are numerous mining projects already under way in 
the Amazon basin, and the government is strongly encouraging further expansion, 
with US$40 billion of new investment expected by 2015. A key role will be played 
by Vale S.A. (formerly the state-owned Companhia Vale do Rio Doce - CVRD), the 
world’s second-largest mining company, which runs the world’s largest iron mine 
at Carajás, situated southeast of the Belo Monte dam (Hall 1989). Over the next few 
years it plans to increase output from 90 million to 130 million tons of iron ore – 
an expansion that will clearly demand a great deal more energy.  In April 2011 it 
announced the acquisition of a nine percent stake in Norte Energia (Bloomberg 
Business Week, 28 April 2011).  Vale S.A. already operates nine hydroelectric power 
stations in other parts of Brazil to satisfy its huge demand for energy from its 
mining activities, and it clearly expects to receive large amounts of electricity from 
Belo Monte. 
 Several Brazilian analysts, particularly those on the left, have highlighted 
the problems associated with this model of development.10  First, it is encouraging 
Brazil to become ever more dependent on exports of raw materials at the expense 
of manufactured exports. This means continuing an age-old pattern by which 
Brazil plays a subordinate role in the international division of labour, exporting 
products that have had very little value added; and it leaves the Brazilian economy 
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vulnerable to the price oscillations and speculative crises that characterise the 
commodities sector. While it is true that the decline in Brazilian manufacturing has 
had multiple causes, including high interest rates and the influx of speculative 
capital, which have led to the appreciation of the real, the relative success of the 
current model has given the government the leeway to avoid tackling the problems 
facing the manufacturing sector, which are of great importance to Brazil’s long-
term development.  
 Secondly, this model has been imposed from the top down, involving little 
consultation of local people. As the convoluted history of Belo Monte and other 
Brazilian dams shows, decision-making around hydropower construction in Brazil 
lacks transparency, to say the least. Fearnside observes, for example, that ‘the 
environmental study and licensing process for the Belo Monte dam are viewed 
merely as bureaucratic rubber stamps to legalise a decision that has already been 
made.’ He and many others are calling for a radical change in the decision-making 
system to allow a fairer representation of interests and to restrain the ability of 
construction companies to mould development priorities.11  
 A third concern centers on the harm to ecosystems and biodiversity caused 
by this model of development. In his study of the impact of IIRSA, Timothy J. 
Killeen concludes: ‘Deforestation and forest degradation are fully under way along 
the margins of the Amazon. IIRSA and related initiatives will lead to the further 
fragmentation of the Amazon, accelerate forest degradation in the Andes, and 
complete the conversion of the Cerrado savannas to cropland’ (Killeen 2007). 
Awareness is growing among scientists over the importance of the Amazon 
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rainforest in both maintaining the global climate and conserving rainfall patterns 
in southern Brazil and surrounding countries.  
A recent report by the World Bank warned about the severe consequences 
of disrupting rainfall in the Amazon basin: ‘The Amazonian rainforest plays a 
crucial role in the climate system. It helps to drive atmospheric circulation in the 
tropics by absorbing energy and recycling about half of the rainfall that falls on it. 
Furthermore, the region is estimated to contain about 10 percent of the global 
carbon stored in ecosystems … Disruptions in the volumes of moisture coming 
from the Amazon basin could trigger a process of desertification over vast areas of 
Latin America and even in North America’ (de la Torre, Fajnzylber, Nash 2009: 8). 
 The Brazilian government is confident that it can prevent big projects, 
including both dams and mines, doing widespread damage to the ecosystem, but 
many environmentalists are far less confident. The Brazilian government intends 
to build more than 60 large dams in the Amazon basin over the next 20 years to 
supply its national electric grid.12 As yet, the authorities have never managed to 
prevent a disorderly and environmentally destructive influx of loggers, cattle 
companies, agribusiness and peasant farmers when it has opened up a region for 
development and, despite the government’s growing efforts to protect large areas 
of forest by creating reserves and parks, few Brazilian environmentalists are 
confident that they will be more successful in the future. 
 Moreover, as noted above and contrary to widespread belief, hydroelectric 
power stations are not environmentally friendly, particularly in tropical regions. 
Brazil’s National Institute for Space Research (INPE) has calculated that the 
world’s 52,000 large dams emit 104 million metric tonnes of methane annually 
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from reservoir surfaces, turbines, spillways and rivers downstream  (Lima, Ramos, 
Bambace, Rosa 2007: 193-206). This implies that dam methane emissions are 
responsible for at least four per cent of the total warming impact of human 
activities.  Fearnside, who has extensively researched dams’ greenhouse gas 
emissions, found that releases from Curuá-Una in Pará state were 3.5 times higher 
than they would have been if a fossil-fuel-burning counterpart had produced the 
electricity.  
 If, as suggested earlier, a much larger dam – Babaquara/Altamira – is 
eventually built upstream because of Belo Monte’s low generating capacity in the 
dry season, Fearnside believes that the two dams would together produce, during 
the first ten years of operation, emissions four times higher than an equivalent 
fossil-fuel plant. After 20 years, the project would still have 2.5 times the 
emissions of a fossil-fuel plant. Brazilian activists have repeatedly said that it is 
impossible to raise these issues with BNDES officials, who repeatedly refuse to 
provide information and to discuss the problems. The BNDES clearly needs to 
become far more accountable: at the moment, it has a poor record in consulting 
with local communities, lacks a good policy of access to information and has little 
transparency.   
 What becomes clear from the Belo Monte fiasco is the close link between 
political empowerment and true development. It is almost 30 years since the 
military withdrew from political life yet little has changed for most people living in 
the Brazilian Amazon (who now total 20 million).  Just as when the military 
decided to construct the Transamazon Highway in the 1970s, far-reaching change 
is still being imposed on the local people, with little effort made to consult them or 
 18 
even to explain properly what is happening. A rebalancing of the Brazilian 
economy away from commodities in favour of manufactures might reduce tension 
in the Amazon basin but it would not, in itself, improve the lives of the people 
living there. They might well be abandoned by the state, which in its way might be 
just as harmful as the current ill-conceived ‘development’. What is really needed 
are long and painstaking efforts both to break the control of the old and often 
corrupt political elites that still dominate the region and to protect the social, 
economic and legal rights of the people. 
  
Wider debate over energy 
Part of the process of empowerment would involve a fuller public debate, not just 
in the Amazon region but in the whole of Brazil about the country’s energy needs 
and how they should be met. Currently, Brazil is regarded internationally as a 
‘clean’ energy producer because hydroelectric dams generate over four-fifths of its 
energy, which is widely perceived as being environmentally friendly. Yet Brazil is 
in fact the world’s  seventh largest CO2 emitter, caused largely by forest burning 
(Parker and Blodgett 2008).  Even though huge amounts of oil have been 
discovered in the so-called pre-sal fields off the coast of Rio de Janeiro, the 
Brazilian government expects large hydro-projects to continue to play a key role 
in energy supply, as is clear in the Plano Decenal de Energia, the ten-year energy 
plan, published in May 2010. 
 Is there an alternative to large and destructive dams in the Amazon, given 
that the Brazilian economy needs large amounts of relatively cheap and clean 
energy? Greenpeace thinks there is. In a detailed study, it argues that, in a country 
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so abundantly endowed with sun, wind and land, renewables can provide 
abundant energy, while at the time creating thousands of jobs and helping Brazil 
to win markets abroad (Greanpeace.org 2010).  Brazil is already a world leader in 
ethanol production and it could, Greenpeace argues, develop a similar level of 
expertise in solar and wind energy. It is not necessary either to exploit the pre-sal 
oil (which would mean that Brazil remains a heavy CO2 emitter, even if it 
successfully imposes a moratorium on forest felling in the Amazon) or to build 
further big dams. It is only necessary, Greenpeace maintains, to develop one 
relatively ‘dirty’ source of energy – gas – and then only for a transitional period.  
Its analysis shows that by 2050 Brazil’s energy could come from the following 
sources: hydroelectric power (46%), wind (20%), biomass (17%), solar (9%) and 
natural gas (7%). Greenpeace’s plan foresees the construction of no more big 
dams but of many smaller and far less damaging mini dams, to serve the energy 
needs of local communities. 
 Can Greenpeace win support for its alternative vision? It will be difficult, 
not least because of the expectations of enormous wealth to be created by the pre-
sal oil fields. Yet it is possible to change attitudes. Climate change is already 
creating havoc in Brazil, with freak weather events occurring all the country; some 
parts of the Amazon basin are getting so hot during the dry season that they are 
fast becoming uninhabitable.  As in many other countries, there is growing public 
unease at what is happening, although few people have any idea of what can be 
done. What is needed is public debate in which government officials and 
environmentalists discuss the issues in an honest and open way.  
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Conclusion 
Will the development model change under Dilma Rousseff? Brazil is keen to 
present itself as a world leader in international climate-change talks. It is 
committed in its National Climate Change Plan to an 80 per cent reduction in the 
rate of deforestation by 2020 in order to meet its voluntary targets on greenhouse 
gas emissions. Indeed, deforestation rates began falling in 2006 and continued to 
do so steadily, as a result of both increased environmental controls and falling 
international demand for commodities such as beef, soya beans and timber as a 
result of the global economic recession.  In May 2011, however, INPE announced 
that its satellites had detected an accumulated 27 per cent increase in forest 
clearance between August 2010 and April 2011 (Falcão 2011). In the state of Mato 
Grosso the rate of forest clearance had actually doubled during the period. 
Analysts tentatively attributed the rise in forest clearance to the more buoyant 
rate of economic growth in Brazil and to fears by landowners that controls over 
forest clearance might become much stricter in future.  
 It is as yet unclear whether the Rousseff government will act firmly to 
reduce environmental damage both in the Amazon basin and in the country as a 
whole. In late May 2011 the Chamber of Deputies approved by a large majority, 
against the wishes of the executive, a Bill (PL 1876/99) to substantially weaken 
the country’s 1965 forest code. The Bill included, controversially, an amnesty for 
landowners who had cleared more land than is permitted by law. Although the 
battle is far from over at the time of writing, the vote does not bode well for 
environmental policy in Brazil. The agrarian lobby (bancada ruralista), an alliance 
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of right-wing landowners and their allies in Congress, is strong and will attempt to 
push the bill through the Senate. 
President Rousseff could use her presidential veto to prevent some of the 
more damaging changes in the code becoming law, but such a strategy would 
erode a great deal of her political capital. In the past, as Minister of Mines and 
Energy in the first Lula administration, Dilma Rousseff showed little sympathy for 
the environmentalist cause and was a firm defender of the big development 
projects being implemented under the PAC. Since becoming president, Rousseff 
has said little about the environment, biodiversity or climate change. Although an 
unprecedented environmental disaster could change her views, at the moment 
there is little to suggest that Rousseff will be other than a fervent advocate of the 
development model promoted by her predecessor.  
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NOTES 
1 For a detailed account of the history of Belo Monte and its organizational 
conflicts, see P. M. Fearnside (2006) Dams in the Amazon: Belo Monte and Brazil’s 
Hydroelectric Development of the Xingu River Basin, Environmental Management, 
38 (1): 16–27. http://www.springerlink.com/content/65j70r74581gl231/ 
 
2 The dams planned in the 1979 study were Kararaô (later renamed Belo Monte), 
nearby Babaquara (later known as Altamira), Ipixuna, Kakraimoro, Iriri and Jarina. 
 
3 The Japanese–Brazilian firm Alunorte at nearby Barcarena (Pará) produces 2.4 
million tons of alumina annually, and will be complemented by a Chinese–Brazilian 
alumina plant at the same site producing 10 million tons of alumina. The US 
company Alcoa will also produce alumina at a new plant to be built at Jurutí. The 
Japanese–Brazilian aluminum smelter Albrás is also due to expand production as 
the result of expanded electricity supplies. See Fearnside, op. cit. (2006). 
 
4 Message from Pandora, released in November 2010. 
 
5 See P. M. Fearnside (2002) Greenhouse gas emissions from a hydroelectric 
reservoir (Brazil’s Tucuruí Dam) and the energy implications, Water, Air and Soil 
Pollution, 133 (1–4), 69–96. 
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6 Fearnside (op. cit., 2006) gives the examples of Balbina and Tucuruí, both of 
which were filled to several metres above the permitted water level without 
formal agreement, thus expanding the inundated area. 
 
7 See Carlos Tautz, Fekipe Siston, João Roberto Lopes Pinto and Luciana Badin, 
‘BNDES no período Lula: Estado mais ativo, porém não mais autônomo’, 
http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:GZqWFSVak64J:www.plataformabn
des.org.br/index.php/pt/biblioteca/doc_download/46-o-bndes-e-a-
reorganizacao-do-capitalismo-brasileiro-um-debate-
necessario+BNDES+no+período+Lula:+Estado+mais+ativo 
 
8 For instance, in 2009 disbursements from the BNDES were worth US$68.78bn, 
compared with US$11.85bn from the IDB and US$18.56bn from the World Bank. 
 
9 In 2010 the companies’ share increased to 82 percent. 
 
10 See, among others, Tautz, Siston, Lopes Pinto and Badin, op. cit.; Francisco de 
Oliveira (2006) Lula in the Labyrinth,  New Left Review 42, November–December 
2006. 
 
11 See Fearnside, op. cit. (2006): 9. 
 
12 Mentioned in various documents such as: P.M. Fearnside (2001) Environmental 
Impacts of Brazil’s Tucuruí Dam: Unlearned Lessons for Hydroelectric 
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Development, Environmental Management, 27 (3): 377–96; Brazil, EPE (2010), 
Plano Decenal de Expansão de Energia 2019, Ministerio de Minas e Energia, 
Empresa de Pesquisa Energética. 
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